











Abstract. In this paper I discuss the Newman problem in the context of 
contemporary epistemic structural realism (ESR). I formulate Newman’s objection 
in terms that apply to today’s ESR and then evaluate a defence of ESR based on 
Carnap’s use of Ramsey sentences and Hilbert’s ε-operator. I show that this 
defence improves the situation by allowing a formal stipulation of non-structural 
constraints. However, it fails short of achieving object individuation in the context 
of satisfying the Ramsified form of a theory. Thus, while limiting the scope of 
Newman’s argument, Carnap sentences do not fully solve the problem. 






This paper discusses M.H.A. Newman’s objection to structuralism, 
in connection with today’s structural realism and Carnap 
sentences. In this section I will present Newman’s main points 
against Bertrand Russell’s early version of structuralism in a 
reformulated version, in order to indicate how it applies to 
epistemic structural realism. Then, in the following sections, I 
propose to expand the argument for structuralism by introducing 
Rudolf Carnap’s use of Ramsey sentences and Hilbert’s ε-operator 
as a way of getting around the Newman problem. The main aim of 
this paper is to consider whether Newman’s problem can be solved 
by applying Carnap sentences to the Ramseified theory. I maintain 
that the use of Ramsey sentences together with the Carnap 
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sentence can elucidate a great deal of Newman’s problem, but it 
does not dissolve it completely. 
Today’s epistemic structuralists’ strategy of obtaining the 
structure of a theory Φ involves the use of Ramsey sentences. The 
Ramseification of a theory Φ substitutes theoretical terms of which 
we do not know whether or not they denote with existentially 
quantified predicate variables. The corresponding Ramsey sentence 
for a theory Φ(O1…On; T1…Tm)1 will be Ǝt1, …, Ǝtm[(O1, …, On; t1, …, tm)]. 
The Ramsey sentence of a theory states only that there are some 
objects, properties or relations that satisfy a certain structure, but 
we do not know exactly what those objects, properties or relations 
are. Ramseification has the advantage of eliminating theoretical 
terms of which we do not know whether they have a referent or 
not in the real world, thus showing that we need not to commit to 
the existence of these entities. 
The Newman problem says that structure is not sufficient to 
uniquely pick out any relation in the world. Suppose that the 
world consists of a set of n objects that satisfy a structure W with 
respect to some relation R about which nothing else is known. If 
this is the case, then only the number n of elements is relevant for 
satisfying W, meaning that any collection of things can be 
organised in that same structure, with the single condition that it 
contains enough elements. Thus formal structure is irrelevant for 
our knowledge, since it does not single out any unique referents to 
satisfy a certain relation. 
Ladyman (1998) points out that Newman’s difficulty regarding 
structuralism is applicable to today’s epistemic structural realism. 
If the Ramsey sentence of a theory Φ is empirically adequate 
(when all its observational consequences are true), then Φ is 
necessarily true as well, as a simple matter of high-order logic. 
We can reformulate Newman’s problem for the epistemic 
structural realism as follows: 
 
                                                          
1  Where O1…On are observational terms, and T1…Tm theoretical terms. 
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a.  If ESR is true, then it is sufficient to know the formal 
structure of relations. 
b.  Suppose that the world consists of a set of objects that 
satisfy the structure W with respect to R. 
c. If nothing else is known about R, then any set of objects 
arranged so that it takes the structure W. 
d.  If the structure can be obtained using any set of objects, 
then the formal structure does not individuate R. 
e.  Hence, it is not sufficient to know the formal structure. 
: . Hence, ESR is false. 
 
Clearly, the most obvious way to get around the Newman problem 
is to deny premise (c), which stipulates that, in a structuralist view, 
any set of objects can satisfy a certain structure. But how can one 
argue against premise (c) without further stipulating other things 
that go beyond structural description, such as referring to a 
particular relation by specifying a certain context for it? 
 
 
II. Carnap sentences and the ε-operator 
 
Friedman (2011) addresses the use of Carnap-sentences in the 
context of recent discussions on structural realism and concludes 
that the Newman problem raised in the said context does not 
represent a viable objection for Carnap’s conception (Friedman 
2011, p. 13). In what follows, I will attempt to explain how 
Friedman reaches this conclusion. 
Friedman’s own formulation of the Newman problem2 is 
focused on the fifth premise of our initial reformulation of the 
argument. He states that the problem is that if the Ramsey 
                                                          
2  ‘The problem, roughly, is that, if the Ramsey sentence is empirically 
adequate (if all its observational consequences are true), then it is 
necessarily true as well—true as a simple matter of (higher-order) logic. So 
it does not seem, after all, that the Ramsey sentence, as Carnap proposes, 
can faithfully represent the synthetic content that our original theory is 
supposed to have.’ (Friedman 2011, p. 4) 
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sentence of a theory is empirically adequate, then it is logically 
true – given the fact that any set of objects could satisfy the 
implied Ramsey sentence; but if this is the case, then the Ramsey 
sentence cannot faithfully represent the synthetic content of the 
original theory – hence, it is not sufficient to know the structure of 
a theory. However, Friedman notices that Carnap’s Ramsey 
sentences have factual content simply because they state that there 
are observable events in the world such that there are numbers or 
classes of numbers, which are correlated with the events in a 
prescribed way. Thus here lies the key in avoiding the Newman 
problem: it seems that Carnap does not presuppose that an 
abstract theory has any synthetic or factual content beyond its 
empirical adequacy. Thus there is no synthetic content such that 
the Ramsey sentence would fail to successfully represent. The 
Newman problem is eluded as a consequence of Carnap’s neutralism. 
Roughly, Carnap believes that we are not ontologically 
committed to the idea that theoretical terms have real denotation. 
He stipulates that the values of the variables of a theoretical 
language range over a domain of entities including not electrons 
or atoms, but a denumerable sequence isomorphic to the natural 
numbers. Thus, the domain D of entities contains only numbers 
and classes of numbers. Proceeding to physics, all entities needed 
as values for the variables are constructed within the mathematical 
domain D. Therefore, having a language that contains theoretical 
terms becomes a matter of preference3. 
Moreover, Carnap makes use of Ramsey sentences but only 
as a constituent of the full formalisation of a theory. The Ramsey-
                                                          
3  ‘It is obvious that there is a difference between the meanings of the 
instrumentalist and the realist way of speaking. My view, which I shall not 
elaborate here, is essentially this. I believe that the question should not be 
discussed in the form: ‘Are theoretical entities real?’ but rather in the form 
‘Shall we prefer a language of physics (and of science in general) that 
contains theoretical terms, or a language without such terms?’ From this 
point of view the question becomes one of preference and practical 
decision.’ (Friedman 2011, pp. 2-3) 
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sentence of a theory, (Ǝu)TC(u, o)4, only captures the synthetic 
aspect of a theory, while the analytic feature is pictured by a meaning 
postulate. Roughly, Carnap takes a theory TC to be equivalent 
with ‘RTC & (RTC ⸧ TC)’ (Psillos 2000b, p. 268), where ‘RTC’ is the 
Ramsey-sentence of a theory that gives the factual content, while 
‘RTC ⸧ TC’ is a meaning postulate which says that if there is a class 
of entities that satisfy the Ramsey sentence, then the theoretical 
terms of that theory refer to the members of that class. 
Now, as far as this goes, it seems that Newman’s problem has 
actually deepened under the Carnap abstraction of a theory. Since 
any set of objects could realise the structure given by the Ramsey 
sentence, it follows from the postulate that the terms of any theory 
denote. But Carnap ingeniously makes use of Hilbert’s ε-operator 
such that relations are properly satisfied by relevant entities and 
not by any random set of objects. Thus, theoretical terms are to be 
explicitly defined, but only partially, with the help of the ε-operator 
(Psillos 2000a, p. 156), which picks up certain entities from a 
non-empty class, such that those entities satisfy the implied relation. 
The ε-operator is defined by the following axiom: 
ƎxFx⸧F(εxFx) – if anything has the property F, then the entity εxFx 
has the property F, where εxFx is an ε-representative of the elements 
of a non-empty class F, without further specifying which element it 
stands for. For instance (Psillos 2000b, p. 171), take εn, where n = 1 
or n = 2 or n = 3. Take ‘a’ to be the abbreviation of the ε-expression 
that is an element of the class which contains the elements 1, 2 and 3. 
Now what we know is that a is either 1 or 2 or 3, but we cannot say 
whether a=1 is true or false. 
Therefore, if we have a theory TC whose theoretical terms 
form an n-tuple t=<t1…tn>, then the Hilbert ε-operator allows us to 
select an arbitrary class among the classes of entities which satisfy 
the representative of the ith member of the n-tuple. This way we 
can define every theoretical term of the theory such that it is not the 
case that any set of objects could be arranged to satisfy the formal 
                                                          
4  We use this simplified form instead of ‘(∃u1)…(∃un)TC(u1…un, o1…on) 
where ‘u1…un’ are the variable that stand for logical terms. 
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structure of the theory. The Carnap sentence of a theory can now be 
re-written in the following form: ‘TC((εuTC(u, o)), o) ⸧ TC(t, o)’. 
 
 
III. A problem of individuation 
 
I trust that I am not mistaken in saying that not all epistemic 
structural realists would come to terms with Friedman’s response 
to the Newman problem through Carnap sentences. Clearly, it is 
Carnap’s neutralism that makes his Ramsey sentences immune to 
Newman’s problem by stipulating that the values of the variables 
of his theoretical language range over a domain containing 
numbers and sets of numbers. This view is definitely compatible 
with epistemic structural realism, since it does not imply any 
ontological commitment towards objects; however, it can rather 
satisfy a more instrumentalist kind of epistemic structuralist. 
It might be possible to make use of the Carnap sentence such 
that it could also offer a solution to the Newman problem for the 
epistemic structural realists. Having an epistemic constraint on 
realism means commitment to the structure of our best scientific 
theories but agnosticism about the rest of the content. In other 
words, the variables of a theory are taken to range over whatever 
there is which satisfies the structure, yet the things that satisfy the 
said structure can be known only by description. In this case, the 
use of the ε-operator can function more or less as a definite 
description, picking up exactly those things that satisfy a certain 
relation, such that it is not the case that any set of objects could 
satisfy the structure of a theory. 
Up until now, the conclusion is that it is no longer the case 
that we can obtain the structure W using any set of objects, since the 
Hilbert operator picks up elements that are relevant for satisfying 
certain relations. This means that an important part of Newman’s 
problem is indeed avoided by Carnap’s use of Ramsey sentences 
together with the ε-operator. But does it also solve the problem of 
individuation indicated in premise (d) of Newman’s problem? 
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The point raised by Maxwell when introducing Ramsey 
sentences for eliminating theoretical terms from our discourse was 
that we can only have epistemic access to unobservable entities (be it 
objects or processes) through description, and not by acquaintance 
(Ladyman 2014). Thus we can only know the structural properties 
of these entities, such that we can merely understand the meaning 
of theoretical terms structurally. But dealing with descriptions is 
already a problematic matter. 
Take the case of definite descriptions – suppose your 
neighbours are twins, but you do not know that. However, you use 
the description ‘the neighbour that lives across the hall, with tiny, 
black eyes and greasy hair’ to refer to one or the other. The 
description is still a definite description in virtue of its syntactical 
form, but it is satisfied by two different objects. Russell would say 
that the above definite description is not a correct one, since it does 
not pick up a unique object5. However, based solely on its structure, 
we have a case of isomorphism. In reality, we know that the implied 
description is not a correct definite description because we can also 
get to know the twins by acquaintance and not only by description. 
Let’s get back to the example used in the previous section to 
illustrate the use of the ε-operator. Take εn, where n = 1 or n = 2 or 
n=3. When you take ‘a’ to be an element of the class which contains 
the elements 1, 2 and 3, you know that ‘a’ is either 1 or 2 or 3, but 
you cannot say whether a = 1 is true or false. With respect to the 
problem of individuation, the ε-operator works no better than a 
flawed definite description – it picks up one of the numbers which 
correspond to satisfying the description, but it does not 
individuate, since it can be either of the three given options. 
In physics we cannot always know whether there is a case of 
isomorphism or not. Hence the formal structure can still not 
individuate properly. If this is the case, then the structuralist has to 
either accept the fact that a problem of individuation remains 
                                                          
5  ‘Now the, when it is strictly used, it involves uniqueness; we do, it is true, 
speak of “the son of So-and-so” even when So-and-so has several sons, but 
it would be more correct to say “a son of So-and-so”.’ (Russell 1905) 
 LARISA-IOANA GOGIANU 30 
unsettled, or to defend the idea that isomorphism does not 
represent an issue for our knowledge of scientific theories. 
It might be inviting to conclude that the Newman problem 
undermines all forms of structural realism, in so far as it shows 
that some or other kind of non-structural information must be added 
as constraints over the range of the variables of the Ramsified 
theory. Rudolf Carnap, on the other hand, shows that we can 
impose some constraints on the range of the variables, constraints 
which we would not describe as ‘non-structural information’. 
These guarantee that it is not the case that any set of objects can 
satisfy the Ramsified form of a theory, hence they dissolve a great 
deal of the Newman problem. Nonetheless, even if the Carnap 
sentences idea represents an improvement over the Ramsified 
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